Comparative Study of Contact Tracing Application Across the World
We studied contact tracing applications developed by 9 countries on certain parameters. All these applications have been launched and developed by their respective state entities except for Norway whose application has been developed in public private collaboration.
| S. No. | Application | Launched By | Developer | Nature | Centralised/ Decentralised | Compatible Hardware | Source Code | Sunset Clause | Data Retention Period | Data Collection | Revocation of Consent to Collect Data | Functionality | Bluetooth/ GPS |
| 1. |
Singapore |
Singapore Government Digital Services |
Voluntary |
Centralised |
Android & iOS |
Open |
Users will be prompted to disable its functionality or uninstall it when contact tracing ceases. However, no specific sunset data has been provided. |
21 days (in case the user has not come in contact with a COVID-19 case) |
Mobile Number and a random anonymised user ID. However, anonymised data is collected about user’s device and app for improving the user experience. It does not collect user’s location data. |
Allows revocation of consent. Data collected is then deleted from the government server. |
COVID-19 Contact Tracing |
Bluetooth |
|
| 2. |
Austria |
Austrian Red Cross |
Voluntary |
Decentralised |
Android & iOS |
Open |
End of pandemic. |
i. Metadata: 14 days ii. Data of suspected cases:30 days iii. Data on device for digital handshake with intensive contacts: 7 days |
No personal data collected unless tested positive |
Un-installation or withdrawal shall amount to withdrawal of consent. Allows for partial withdrawal by deactivating the automatic “digital handshake”. |
Medical reporting, COVID-19 contact tracing |
Bluetooth |
|
| 3. |
India |
NIC eGov Mobile App |
Voluntary (best effort basis) |
Centralised |
Android & iOS |
Closed |
– |
i. If user has not come in contact with any COVID-19 positive user: 30 days ii. If user has come in contact with any COVID-19 positive user: 45 days; iii. If tested positive for COVID-19: 60 days after such person has been declared cured of COVID-19. |
User’s location details, age, name, sex, phone number, profession, and travel history of last 30 days. |
Does not provide the option of withdrawing consent for data collection. Instead, it provides that a registered user may remove registration information supplied. At one place, privacy policy states that all personal information collected at time of registration will be retained as long as user’s account remains in existence and for such period thereafter. However, there is no provision for account deletion. |
Medical reporting, COVID-19 contact tracing, Telemedicine consultations |
Bluetooth & GPS |
|
| 4. |
Australia |
Australian Department of Health |
Voluntary |
Decentralised |
Android and iOS |
Open |
End of Pandemic |
21 days; The data, however, is stored on Amazon Web Services servers. |
Name, mobile number, postcode, age range. |
On un-installation, all COVIDSafe app information will be deleted from phone. However, information stored in the secure information storage system will be destroyed at the end of pandemic. The users are also given an option to delete their information from the storage system before the end of pandemic. |
COVID-19 contact tracing |
Bluetooth |
|
| 5. |
Colombia |
National Institute of Health |
Voluntary (users installing CoronApp will get access to free internet) |
C entralised |
Android and iOS |
Open, however, code not published yet. |
– |
– |
Collects public, semi-private, private, and sensitive data from users; information sought at the time of registration includes name, sex, date of birth, ethnicity, and email. |
– |
Medical reporting, COVID-19 contact tracing |
Bluetooth & GPS |
|
| 6. |
Israel |
Ministry of Health |
Voluntary |
Decentralised |
Android and iOS |
Open |
– |
– |
Location (on user’s device) and it is cross-referenced with the Ministry of Health’s epidemiological data. |
Not available as information is stored in user’s device. |
COVID-19 contact tracing |
GPS |
|
| 7. |
Norway |
Public-Private, The National Institute of Public Health and Simula |
Voluntary |
C entralised |
Android and iOS |
Closed |
December 1, 2020. |
30 days |
Mobile number, age, GPS location, operating system, mobile operator, version number, phone model, Bluetooth data. |
Allows user to delete its personal information any time. The function for this has been provided in the App. Such information will be deleted both centrally and from the device. |
COVID-19 contact tracing, route tracking |
Bluetooth & GPS |
|
| 8. |
Czech Republic |
Ministry of Health |
Voluntary |
Decentralised |
Android. |
Open |
– |
30 days. If user agrees to send data from phone to server, it will retained for 12 hours. Mobile number, however, is stored for 6 months or as ascertained by the Ministry of Health. |
Does not track or collect information about location. Information is stored in user’s device. However, it requires a phone number for registration |
Allows user to delete its data anytime from its device as well as the server of hygienists. The phone number can also be deleted. However, the ID number assigned to the user is recorded. |
COVID-19 contact tracing |
Bluetooth |
|
| 9. |
North Macedonia |
Ministry of Information Society and Administration Social |
Voluntary |
Decentralised |
Android & iOS. |
Closed |
– |
14 days |
Mobile number, unique random code |
– |
COVID-19 contact tracing |
Bluetooth |
